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YALTA PLANS FOR GERMANY OFFER MODEL FOR HANDLING JAPAN

THE bold evolution of American strategy in the Pacific, following closely on the European settlement achieved at Yalta, constitutes a powerful blow to the hopes of Japanese leaders. It is clear that great problems are posed for the enemy by the American landings on Corregidor, the two-day attack on the Tokyo-Yokohama area by more than 1,200 carrier planes, and the invasion of Iwo Island, 750 miles from Tokyo. These moves point toward early conclusion of the key phases of the Philippine campaign, acceleration of the air and sea war against the Japanese homeland and the execution of new landings in the Bonin Islands, or on Formosa and the China coast. But what is not so deeply appreciated in American comment is the political effect of the Crimea meeting on Tokyo's expectations that it can either avoid military defeat or escape the full consequences of losing the war.

YALTA DAMPENS HOPES OF JAPANESE.

The Japanese government and a section of the Japanese people have been aware for some time of their inability to avert military disaster if the Pacific Allies remain determined to fight through to the end. These Japanese presumably have put their faith in the possibility that political divisions among the Allies—divisions which Japan would encourage by fighting as hard as it could to prolong the war—might finally bring an offer of negotiated peace or permit a revival of Japanese militarism after apparent defeat. The results achieved at Yalta indicate that these are dim prospects for, instead of disintegrating as the destruction of Nazism approaches, the Big Three coalition is growing firmer, and problems that could not be handled adequately heretofore are being dealt with more concretely and satisfactorily. Far from seeking to play a lone hand in settling the future of Europe, each of the major Allies is showing an ever greater tendency toward compromise and the pooling of responsibility.

All this must be extremely discouraging to the militarists in Tokyo, for if the Big Three can maintain and develop a harmonious approach to the decisive problem of Germany, it is very unlikely that their unity will later founder on the issues raised by the future of Japan. Moreover, the specific terms laid down for Germany at Yalta may well cause apprehension to Premier Koiso and his government, since these terms are also capable of being applied to a defeated Japan.

There is, for example, no reason why the victorious powers in Asia should not follow some of the main clauses of the Crimea declaration and agree to disarm and disband all Japanese armed forces; break up for all time the Japanese General Staff; remove or destroy all Japanese military equipment; and eliminate or control all Japanese industry that could be used for military production. They could also pledge to bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment; exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Japanese; wipe out militaristic laws, organizations and institutions; and remove all fascist and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the Japanese people. At the same time, with the Japanese as with the Germans, it should not be our purpose to destroy the people, but rather to offer them "hope for a decent life . . . and a place . . . in the comity of nations."

In view of the implications of Yalta, Japan may make intensive efforts to find a way out by offering attractive terms for a negotiated peace. It was against such stratagems that Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., warned on February 19, when he declared that to stop short of unconditional surrender would be "the greatest crime in the history of our country."

WILL RUSSIA FIGHT JAPAN? The only Far Eastern implication of the Yalta agreement that has drawn much comment is the possibility that it fore-

shadows a deterioration in Soviet-Japanese relations. Speculation has revolved about the fact that the forthcoming conference on world security organization will open in San Francisco on April 25, the day on which the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact went into effect in 1941. Under the terms of the treaty, it is to expire in 1946 at the end of a 5-year period, if denounced by either party one year before that time. But if neither signatory takes action, the pact is to be extended for an additional five years to 1951. It is therefore clear that April 25 would be a particularly appropriate date for launching security discussions if the Russians had previously denounced the treaty.

On the other hand, while the Japanese are undoubtedly worried about the time and place of the San Francisco conference, these circumstances are explicable without reference to Soviet-Japanese relations, and it would be unfortunate if the American public risked unnecessary disillusionment by taking it for granted that the Russians intend to denounce the treaty. In recent years the Japanese have been extremely anxious to maintain good relations with Moscow, even going to the extent last March of surrendering their oil and coal concessions in Soviet-owned north Sakhalin 26 years before the expiration date of the leases. It is possible that the Japanese might now be willing to go still further in settling outstanding differences between themselves

and Moscow, for the sake of winning an extension of the treaty.

NEUTRALITY PACT NOT MAIN ISSUE. Actually the neutrality pact is not the decisive factor in Soviet-Japanese relations, since the Russians undoubtedly could find ample ground for entering the war at a later date without now denouncing the treaty, and if they do denounce the treaty, still would not be obliged to fight Japan. In fact, if special emphasis is to be placed on the treaty, then it should be noted that the agreement is scheduled, in any event, to remain in force one year after denunciation.

For some time it has seemed probable that the Russians will ultimately enter the Far Eastern war and make a significant contribution to Japan's defeat. There are two factors behind this conclusion: the interest of the U.S.S.R. in playing a major part in the Far Eastern peace settlement, and the growing unity of the powers on European questions. Both factors are indispensable, since Soviet self-interest could express itself in other ways than joint military action against Japan if harmony of the Big Three were not present. But precisely the opposite is the case, and the Yalta decisions seem to go a long way toward establishing the European political prerequisites for fruitful cooperation in the Far East.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

ARAB LEADERS DRAFT PLANS FOR MIDDLE EAST UNITY

The conference on Arab federation, which opened on February 14 in Cairo, raises issues of ultimate interest to the United States. The conferees from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Transjordan, Syria and the Lebanon have met at a time when the long-standing dispute on termination of the French Mandate over Syria and the Lebanon has arisen again as an indication of the unsettled status of all the Arab nations. This controversy appears momentarily of more interest than the question of Palestine. But both issues and the economic problems of the region suggest that the program now under consideration in Cairo will remain an idle hope unless the great powers which are vitally interested in the region give their sanction and aid to Arab unity.

FRANCO-SYRIAN IMPASSE. Thus far, the basis for Arab unity has been largely negative as is apparent today in the resistance to revival of French influence in the affairs of Syria and the Lebanon. The war has witnessed a weakening of French power in the Middle East, although here as elsewhere General de Gaulle is pressing for maximum participation in areas where French influence was formerly important. The present dispute arises out of the promises made in 1941, when Anglo-French forces entered the French Mandates to prevent their

passing into the hands of Vichy followers. At that time the independence of the two states was proclaimed, and in 1943 General Catroux signed an agreement whereby all functions exercised by France, along with the staffs, were to be handed over to the Lebanese and Syrian governments.

During 1944, when a final treaty was to be negotiated with respect to remaining French interests in Syria and Lebanon, the Council of Ministers in France decided unanimously to reject the request that France relinquish control of special security troops in those two countries. The French desire a treaty with the two states, patterned on the treaties Britain has with Egypt and Iraq. On February 2 Georges Bidault, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, reaffirmed France's determination to preserve its authority in this territory. But the issue remains in dispute, for the two Arab states refuse to conclude any final treaty until they feel fully possessed of their sovereign rights.

BIG THREE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. It now appears that Britain will support French demands in the Middle East, although it is clear that French power there will be greatly reduced. While France's influence in the region has waned, the war has revealed that both the United States and Russia in-

tend to share with Britain in the development of the Arab world. The fact that the oil resources of the area constitute the world's second largest petroleum reserves inevitably foreshadows the future interest of all the industrial nations. During 1944 Russian influence especially has grown markedly in the Middle East. In addition to the desire for oil concessions in northern Iran, the Soviet Union has recently established diplomatic relations with several of the Arab states. It is now reported that Russia may send to Teheran a Minister whose position would be comparable to that of Sir Edward Grigg, the British Minister Resident in the Middle East. Also, with the resurgence of the Orthodox Church in Russia, links with various Orthodox groups in the Middle East have been reestablished by the Soviet Union.

Britain's political and strategic interests, the oil resources and the Palestinian question remain of crucial importance in the region. Aside from India, Palestine presents the thorniest imperial problem Britain now faces. Yet, in view of the intransigence of both the Zionists and Arabs, most Britishers find it impossible to think in terms of relinquishing the Palestinian Mandate at any time in the near future, although British initiative is needed here as in India to resolve the deadlock.

The Arab states have looked to Britain for assistance in the movement toward federation, which they feel should flow from the encouragement originally given by Foreign Secretary Eden in 1943 to the cause of Arab unity. They believe that such unity would present an obstacle to further Zionist influence. But today there are some indications that the activities of Zionist groups in the United States have been publicized in the Middle East to counteract Arab desires. This tends to suggest to the Arab world that British and American interests in this region are in conflict, although heretofore it has appeared that Britain would willingly accept American entrance into Middle Eastern affairs.

TREND TOWARD ARAB UNITY. The vexed question of Palestine can probably be solved only in terms of a broader arrangement for the whole area. Moreover since the Middle East must surely prove to be a testing place of the future relations of the great powers, the present Arab conversations are significant beyond the fact that plans for Arab unity up to this point have been largely negative in outlook. The agenda of the present Cairo talks was drafted at a preliminary meeting held last September-October

in Alexandria. That conference went further than was expected when the representatives of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq signed a protocol providing for the formation of a League of Arab States with a council designed to coordinate their political programs, safeguard their independence, and study problems affecting the general interests of the Arab countries. Six commissions were set up by the preparatory conference to outline plans for closer cooperation in economic and financial affairs, agriculture, trade, industrial development and communications. The Alexandrian protocol also recorded the desire that Britain maintain its engagement to restrict further Jewish immigration to Palestine and advance that country's independence.

During 1944 another Middle East conference dealt with financial problems of the area and recommended adjustments in price policies and the modernization of tax machinery in the various states. A Middle East Council on Agriculture has already been established, under the auspices of the Middle East Supply Center, in order to work out joint projects for irrigation, research, technical development and education. Although it does not appear feasible to prolong the existence of the MESC, services similar to those it has performed, as well as the expert technical staff organized by the Center, could be utilized in further regional planning and development. However, many of these plans, which would entail loans for capital development from both Britain and the United States, can be realized only if the great powers are prepared to foster the agricultural and industrial development of the Middle East on a regional basis.

GRANT S. MCCLELLAN

Escape via Berlin, by José Antonio de Aguirre. New York, Macmillan, 1944. \$3.00

The young President of the Basque Republic tells the gripping story of his escape from Franco and the Nazis—a story brightened by Dr. Aguirre's unflagging courage and the unstinted kindness of Latin American diplomats in Belgium and Germany who facilitated his escape.

Racial State, the German Nationalities Policy in the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, by Gerhard Jacoby. New York, Institute of Jewish Affairs of the American Jewish Congress and World Jewish Congress, 1944. \$3.00

Valuable as a detailed case study of the application of Nazi policy in the first non-German country annexed.

Great Soldiers of World War II, by Major H. A. De Weerd. New York, W. W. Norton, 1944. \$3.75


The associate editor of the *Infantry Journal* makes an interesting attempt to assess the more prominent military figures as the war progresses.

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Washington News Letter



WILL MEXICO CITY CONFERENCE COPE WITH ARGENTINE ISSUE?

Although the conference agenda ignores the issue, the most exciting question before the extraordinary meeting of delegates of the United and Associated Nations of the Americas, which assembled on February 21 in Mexico City, is whether the United States can frustrate any attempt to divide the hemisphere on the Argentine question. The United States recalled Ambassador Norman Armour from Buenos Aires on June 27, 1944. It has steadfastly refused to consider resumption of diplomatic relations with a government which, as President Roosevelt said on September 29, has repudiated "solemn inter-American obligations" and has fostered "the growth of Nazi-fascist influence and the increasing application of Nazi-fascist methods in . . . this hemisphere."

PROBLEM OF ARGENTINA'S NEIGHBORS.

The key to whether Argentine hopes are raised or dashed at Mexico City will lie in the action taken by representatives of governments in its neighbor countries. The principal goal of Argentine foreign policy has been the development of a bloc of satellites, while the United States goal in Western Hemisphere affairs has been the directly opposite one of maintaining inter-American solidarity—a solidarity that would isolate Argentina if its government continued on the course that inspired President Roosevelt's criticism, or would include it if its government honestly opposed the Axis and reflected a democratic spirit. The United States delegation, at its departure for the meeting, was confident that it could present to Argentina's neighbors a program of inter-American mutual assistance in economic and political matters which would weaken Argentine influence in South America.

As the opening day of the conference drew near Argentine policy wavered uncertainly, but no conciliatory gestures toward the United States, the United Nations and the inter-American concept have been made. On January 29 the government issued a decree of "national security," which not only provides imprisonment for citizens or foreigners who engage in espionage, attempt the overthrow of the régime, disturb public order, or in any way damage the military effectiveness of the armed forces, but also threatens foreign correspondents with imprisonment if convicted of transmitting damaging reports to other countries. On February 16, however, as a result of repeated protests by diplomatic missions in

Argentina, two papers friendly to the Nazis, *Cabildo* and *El Pampero*, were suppressed on the ground that they used imported newsprint. Although some hopeful observers see signs of a growing revolutionary underground, evidence that it is a factor of importance is lacking.

MEXICO CITY AND SAN FRANCISCO. The Mexico City conference will seek to bring the inter-American concept into the projected world system of collective security to be established at the United Nations conference opening in San Francisco on April 25. Some American Republics are prepared to submit proposals which have little chance of acceptance. Chile, for example, wants four seats set aside for the American Republics on the Security Council. Mexico would amend the Dumbarton Oaks provision for five permanent seats and provide for six semi-permanent seats, to be reassigned every eight years. Brazil, which resigned from the League of Nations in 1926 because its demand for a permanent seat on the Council was not granted, would add a sixth permanent seat to the Security Council of the new world organization—which perhaps it would like to occupy. The desire of Latin Americans for some form of security in the post-war period is so great, however, that they will probably accept whatever world security system is proposed at San Francisco, provided adequate guarantees are given to the small nations.

The bargaining power of the United States at San Francisco would of course be enhanced if supported by the American Republics. In the Western Hemisphere today, only Venezuela and Argentina have not declared war on the Axis and cannot qualify for invitations to San Francisco. Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay signed the Declaration of the United Nations as belligerents this month, and Venezuela has pursued policies friendly to the United Nations cause. Argentina, too, took the first step toward war when on February 17 it protested vigorously to the German Foreign Office against the denial of safe conduct to a number of Argentine diplomats who are now in Sweden awaiting repatriation. It is speculative whether a declaration of war would alter Argentina's standing in the American comity of nations, unless it were accompanied by an affirmation of the principle of continental solidarity and genuine evidence of the adoption of more democratic internal policies.

BLAIR BOLLES

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